https://elpais.com/economia/2014/04/28/actualidad/1398699552_887902.html
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285638597_Influencias_politicas_y_empresariales_en_la_prensa_espanola_El_cambio_de_direccion_en_El_Pais
https://elpais.com/internacional/2012/02/20/biografiaeldebate/1329757031_089395.html
FACT 2
https://elpais.com/buscador/?qt=Alandete&sf=1&np=12&bu=ep&of=html
FACT 3
https://calendar.parliament.uk/calendar/Commons/All/2017/12/19/Daily
https://elpais.com/politica/2017/12/19/actualidad/1513667125_373603.html
FACT 4
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/digital-culture-media-and-sport-committee/fake-news/written/80989.html
https://www.cjr.org/business_of_news/catalonia-independence-el-pais-spain.php
https://theintercept.com/2018/04/20/how-fake-news-and-western-propaganda-about-russian-interference-in-catalonia-coerced-ecuador-to-silence-julian-assange/
FACT5
āThe Kremlin is using the Catalan crisis as a way to deepen divisions within Europe and consolidate its international influence. It appears in the form of websites that publish hoax stories, the activity of activists such as WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange and a legion of bots ā millions of automated social media accounts that can turn lies into trending topicsā.
FACT6
āA detailed analysis of 5,000 of Assangeās followers on Twitter provided by TwitterAudit, reveals that 59% are false profilesā. The fact that the tweet went viral so quickly is evidence of the intervention of bots, or false social media profiles, programmed simply to automatically echo certain messagesā
https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2017/09/26/inenglish/1506413477_994601.html?id_externo_rsoc=TW_CM_EN
FACT7
āThis assertion is entirely inaccurate because the data is from an inactive account with no tweets. Julian Assange only started tweeting on February 14th, 2017 [4], but the Twitter Audit data is from February 12th, 2014 [3], three years before anything was tweeted from the accountā.
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/digital-culture-media-and-sport-committee/fake-news/written/80989.html.
Archived Twitter Audit results for @julianassange (archived September 23rd 2017, data from February 12th 2014),
http://archive.is/uFGa4
FACT8
These 2,262 early followers from before Julian Assange started tweeting are not representative of his current 753,000 followers. When an account has no tweets for human users to read yet, there is little reason for real people to follow it, but bots may still automatically follow the inactive account. After reassessing @JulianAssange’s followers on November 24th, 2017, Twitter Audit now shows that 92% of his followers are real. (McGrath)
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/digital-culture-media-and-sport-committee/fake-news/written/80989.html
FACT9
La trama rusa empleó redes chavistas para agravar la crisis catalana
https://elpais.com/politica/2017/11/10/actualidad/1510341089_316043.html
āDos medios del Kremlin, RT y Sputnik, se valieron de un elevadĆsimo nĆŗmero de cuentas en redes sociales en el entorno del chavismo y Venezuela para propagar una imagen negativa de EspaƱa en las jornadas anteriores y posteriores al referĆ©ndum del 1 de octubre, segĆŗn un pormenorizado anĆ”lisis de mĆ”s de cinco millones de mensajes de la universidad George Washington, en EE UUā.
FACT10
Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Fake News Committee (December 19th 2017 evidence session), Paul Farrelly [Q57]: āIt is really about the evidence we have received and the way it is constructed. My second observation about papers like SeƱor Lesacaās is that, unlike a scientific paper, there is no control, no comparator. Sputnikand the Russians were identified; they were the fourth largest of the 5 million that were sending their messages all around. But they were behind El Diario, the BBC and El PaĆs. So I would have liked to have seen, particularly, a comparator paper about what analysis of the BBC content and the way the BBC content was shared around the worldā
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/digital-culture-media-and-sport-committee/fake-news/oral/74926.pdf
FACT11
En toda la noticia no hay un solo enlace al estudio:
https://elpais.com/politica/2017/11/10/actualidad/1510341089_316043.html
FACT12
https://gobiernoabierto.navarra.es/sites/default/files/gobernanza/lesaca_esquiroz_javier_-_junio_2014.pdf
https://www.navarra.es/NR/rdonlyres/1ED6DF55-4BB4-4DC0-B2C1-288F8943A2C3/192318/estructuradepartamentos.pdf
FACT13
CURSO DE POLĆTICADemocracia espaƱola 2015: propuestas de reforma y proyecto de ruptura
https://fundacionfaes.org/es/prensa/45407/curso-de-pola-ticademocracia-espanola-2015-propuestas-de-reforma-y-proyecto-de-ruptura
https://youtu.be/zsI4bOOnS1g?t=3257
FACT15
āJudging by this traffic, a significant part of the early amplification of this post came from automated botsā.
https://medium.com/dfrlab/electionwatch-russia-and-referendums-in-catalonia-192743efcd76
FACT17
McGrath: Researchers have found that like-to-tweet ratios under 0.1 are indicative of an account being a bot, while higher like-to-tweet ratios closer to 1 are more often seen with human users [12]. Bots aiming to amplify or spread tweets have little incentive to interact with tweets in ways that do not lead them to be retransmitted to other users through retweets. Based on these statistics, there is clear evidence that Assange’s tweets are viewed and interacted with by many people, but these interactions follow patterns that are normal for humans and consistent across Assange’s tweets.ā
Gilani, Zafar & Almeida, Mario & Farahbakhsh, Reza & Wang, Liang & Crowcroft, Jon. āStweeler: A Framework for Twitter Bot Analysisā (ACM WWW, July 2016)
https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~lw525/publications/stweeler.pdf
FACT18
āEl anĆ”lisis del Digital Forensic Lab (DFL), una plataforma de expertos digitales, concluyó queā¦ā
https://elpais.com/internacional/2017/09/26/actualidad/1506448073_297753.html
FACT19
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/about/board-of-directors/
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/about/international-advisory-board/
FACT20
C. Rice: Why We Know Iraq Is Lying https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/23/opinion/why-we-know-iraq-is-lying.html
R. Murdoch: Iraq and the Rupert Murdoch connection: The media mogul’s network of pro-war campaigners https://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/press/chilcot-inquiry-report-iraq-war-rupert-murdoch-connection-a7125786.html /// Leading us to war: https://www.abc.net.au/mediawatch/episodes/leading-us-to-war/9972926
C. Powell: Lie After Lie: What Colin Powell Knew About Iraq 15 Years Ago and What He Told the U.N. https://theintercept.com/2018/02/06/lie-after-lie-what-colin-powell-knew-about-iraq-fifteen-years-ago-and-what-he-told-the-un/
J.M.Aznar: Aznar y las armas de destruccion masiva en Irak: https://youtu.be/-pUbgXmy0TY
FACT21: Informe Chilcot: āWe have also concluded that the judgements about the severity of the threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction – WMD – were presented with a certainty that was not justifiedā. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-report-of-the-iraq-inquiry
FACT22: Alandete: La prueba definitiva de que el interĆ©s de quienes movilizan al ejĆ©rcito de bots prorrusos se ha centrado en el pulso independentista en EspaƱa es que entre sus menciones habituales en redes (Siria, Rusia, Ucrania, Trump, Hillary Clinton, ISIS) ha entrado desde hace unos dĆas CataluƱa. AsĆ lo refleja la herramienta Hamilton 68 de la Alianza para Asegurar la Democracia. https://elpais.com/politica/2017/09/22/actualidad/1506101626_670033.html
FACT23: Alandete: āEsa herramienta analiza de forma permanente 600 cuentas, automatizadas o no, en la órbita del Kremlin”. https://elpais.com/politica/2017/09/22/actualidad/1506101626_670033.html /// āOur analysis is based on linked 600 Twitter accounts to Russian influence activities onlineā: https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/hamilton-68-a-new-tool-to-track-russian-disinformation-on-twitter/
FACT24 & 25: McGrath: āLike many other journalists, Alandete seems to have come to questionable conclusions based on haphazard analysis of the Hamilton 68 data. El PaĆs claim that they looked at the trends on the Hamilton 68 dashboard on or around September 22nd, and saw AntiWar.com and Catalonia trending [2]. However, Hamilton 68 only monitors tweets from the previous 48 hours [29] and the AntiWar.com article comparing Barcelona to Tiananmen was published 96 to 120 hours before El PaĆs looked at the data [23]. Assange’s tweets linking to this article were also published 72 to 96 hours before September 22nd [24].ā /// āI found archived copies of the data from September 19th, within 48 hours of both the publication of the article and Assange’s tweets linking to it. On September 19th, neither AntiWar.com nor Catalonia were trending on Hamilton 68 [30]. Of course, the links to this story could have been spread more slowly by bots and trolls, but the more gradual dissemination seen here appears more uncoordinated and organic. In particular, it is quite different than the previous claim that Russian bots and trolls jump to amplify Assange’s tweets and narratives of interest to the Kremlin unusually quickly. It also does not appear that El PaĆs investigated why AntiWar.com was trending on Hamilton 68, and Alandete does not consider that there may be other stories or combinations of stories that caused AntiWar.com to trend on the day they checked Hamilton 68. http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/digital-culture-media-and-sport-committee/fake-news/written/80989.html
FACT26: August 2, 2017: Hamilton 68: A New Tool to Track Russian Disinformation on Twitter. https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/hamilton-68-a-new-tool-to-track-russian-disinformation-on-twitter/
FACT27 & 28: The New Blacklist: https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/the-new-blacklist-202612/ /// āWe choose not to identify the accountsā https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/the-methodology-of-the-hamilton-68-dashboard/
https://theintercept.com/2018/04/20/how-fake-news-and-western-propaganda-about-russian-interference-in-catalonia-coerced-ecuador-to-silence-julian-assange/ https://www.cjr.org/the_media_today/russian-trolls.php
FACT29: TSA Body Scanner Lobbyist Now Overseeing Spending on TSA Security
https://theintercept.com/2015/05/27/tsa-body-scanner-lobbyist-takes-congressional-job-overseeing-spending-tsa-security/
FACT30: https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Morell // https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/the-alliance-for-securing-democracy-releases-strategy-for-democracies-to-offset-autocratic-advances/
FACT31: https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/about-us/advisory-council/
FACT32: Bernie Sanders Asked Bill Kristol to Apologize for Pushing the Iraq War. Guess What Happened Next. https://theintercept.com/2019/05/28/bernie-sanders-asked-bill-kristol-to-apologize-for-pushing-the-iraq-war-guess-what-happened-next/
FACT32: Palacio dice que se han hallado “indicios” de la existencia de armas de destrucción masiva https://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20030814/51262779853/palacio-dice-que-se-han-hallado-indicios-de-la-existencia-de-armas-de-destruccion-masiva.html
FACT34: Ocho ‘Ibex 35’ pagaron una campaƱa contra el ‘procĆ©s’ a petición del Gobierno de Rajoy. https://www.elconfidencial.com/empresas/2019-07-22/ocho-ibex-campana-proces-gobierno-rajoy_2130963/
FACT35: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/es/quienes-somos/
FACT37: https://russia.tv/video/show/brand_id/60851/episode_id/1550866/video_id/1683014/
FACT38: Aleix Espargaró: āVamos a una Guerra Civilā: https://elpais.com/politica/2017/09/22/actualidad/1506093243_142437.html
FACT39: āSpanish democracy has failed,ā the presenter of the talk show Voskresnoye Vremya. https://euvsdisinfo.eu/russian-tvs-view-on-catalonia-referendum-europe-falling-apart-and-spain-compared-to-ukraine/
FACT 40: The Guardian view on Cataloniaās referendum: the Spanish state has lost
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/oct/01/the-guardian-view-on-catalonias-referendum-the-spanish-state-has-lost
FACT41: The pro-Kremlin pulp mill https://euvsdisinfo.eu/the-pro-kremlin-pulp-mill/?highlight=Balear
FACT42: El independentismo: una bomba de relojerĆa contagiosa en un Estado que no escucha
https://mundo.sputniknews.com/espana/201709211072539400-independentismo-mallorca-consecuencias/
FACT43: El partido que gobierna con el PSOE en Baleares plantea un referƩndum para 2030
https://elpais.com/politica/2017/09/19/actualidad/1505810479_059534.html
FACT44: Information Manipulation in Elections and Referenda: Pro-Kremlin Disinformation in Figures: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/information-manipexamples-of-pro-kremlin-disinformation-in-figures/?highlight=Milosevich
FACT45: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/es/quienes-somos/
FACT48: El centro estadounidense Atlantic Council lanza un portal contra la desinformación rusa
https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/06/08/actualidad/1528452873_212777.html?id_externo_rsoc=TW_CC
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